group identity in times of conflict. Roozenbeek holds a Ph.D. in Slavonic Studies from the University of Cambridge and is the author of The Psychology of Misinformation (2024) with Sander van der Linden.
Roozenbeek applied the "Page 99 Test" to his new book, Propaganda and Ideology in the Russian–Ukrainian War, and reported the following:
On page 99 of Propaganda and Ideology in the Russian-Ukrainian War, I compare the differences in narratives present in newspapers and news websites published inside the so-called ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk. In the two previous chapters, I analysed around 80,000 news articles to investigate how the leadership of these two statelets justified their unrecognised declarations of ‘independence’ from Ukraine in early 2014, just after the annexation of Crimea. I analysed newspapers and news sites separately, based on the idea that (local) newspapers are by necessity aimed at locals, whereas news sites can also be read by people living outside of the ‘Republics’. This allowed me to examine the differences in the media discourse that was projected at locals in Ukraine’s occupied territories versus the stories that were told to outsiders.Learn more about Propaganda and Ideology in the Russian–Ukrainian War at the Cambridge University Press website.
I observe that while newspapers at least attempted to make a reference to a shared connection between Donbas and the rest of Ukraine that was lost, and occasionally referred to Donbas as having a unique identity of its own that would justify its supposed desire to move away from Ukraine and towards Russia, this was not the case for news sites. I write on page 99:[In newspaper content, there was a prominent frame] of Ukraine’s guilt in betraying Donbas, the idea that Ukraine’s actions were so egregious that they left the [Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics] no choice but to declare independence. Online, this sense of guilt and the lost potential for peaceful coexistence was replaced by outrage at Ukraine’s alleged crimes, the difference being that there was no sense of a shared history of (relatively) peaceful coexistence whose loss was lamented.The Page 99 Test works quite well for my book. One of my key conclusions is that the Donbas ‘Republics’, which served as a conduit for Russia’s extensive propaganda campaign, the goal of which was to legitimise Russia’s presence in Ukraine and served as a pretext for the 2022 invasion, was disproportionately focused on demonising Ukraine, and painting the country (and its Western ‘puppet-masters’) as evil, fascist, and illegitimate. At the same time, few if any attempts were made to foster an ingroup identity, or a ‘we’ that opposes the ‘they’. As I mention in the book’s introduction,despite a vast reservoir of ideological and historical referents to draw from, neither the [Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics] nor Russia cared much for ideology or history at all, and to their peril. All attempts to build a collective identity were short-lived, vocalised rarely and inconsistently on the pages of local newspapers and websites. Meanwhile, the outgroup, or the ‘they’ that opposes the ‘we’, was subject to a highly detailed and rich discursive construction.In other words, I argue that Russian propaganda missed the mark, and was less sophisticated and more unpersuasively repetitive than is often believed.
By examining a series of opinion polls and analysing large volumes of social media content, I further show that Ukrainian identity crystallised between 2014 (when the war started) and 2022, contrary to the Kremlin’s expectations: instead of driving a wedge between Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian propaganda failed to present an attractive alternative to Ukrainian nationhood among the very people Putin professed to come save.
--Marshal Zeringue