
Parr applied the "Page 99 Test" to his new book, Empowering Workers in an Age of Automation: Social Justice, Technology, and the Future of Work, with the following results:
Page 99 of Empowering Workers in an Age of Automation introduces a moral objection to the structure of contemporary labour markets, which I call the illegitimacy objection. It is an objection to the fact that employers “typically exercise considerable discretionary authority over their staff,” illustrated by the harsh reality for many workers of having to “spend their days subserviently following the commands of their bosses, with little or no say over the nature or order of the tasks that they must carry out.” This objection does not target the specific ways in which such authority is exercised. It is more fundamental than this: it challenges the moral right of employers to tell their employees what to do in the first place, alleging that such workplace authority is illegitimate in much the same way that the political power exercised by undemocratic regimes is illegitimate.Visit Tom Parr's website.
Does page 99 reflect the book as a whole?
Browsers who read only page 99 will, I think, get a relatively accurate sense of what I try to achieve in this book, namely systematically to analyse various moral objections to the structure of contemporary labour markets. What is more, one of my guiding commitments is to present those ideas in the clearest terms, without obfuscation, so that we are better placed to assess their force and implications. In these respects, the text that appears on this page is representative of the broader project.
However, in one way, page 99 gives a misleading impression of the book as a whole, since the objection that I introduce is not one that I endorse. In the pages that follow, I distance myself from this outlook, which seems to overlook the way in which employers’ authority is limited by various laws. Instead, I have come to prefer an alternative approach to theorizing about these matters that focuses on the distribution of bargaining power between workers and firms. I set out that argument in Chapter 1, which is the philosophical heart of the book, and then explore the implications of that approach in the book’s second half.
Perhaps it is a stretch, but I can see one further respect in which this passage does indeed reflect the book as a whole. In particular, it introduces the reader to a novel idea that has become somewhat fashionable these days, at least among a certain category of philosophers, but one that I do not find persuasive because its foundations are too shaky. Conclusions of this kind are ones that recur throughout the entire text, which instead aims to show that more familiar moral objections to the structure of contemporary labour markets are more resilient than often assumed, and that these have more appealing implications than is generally recognized.
--Marshal Zeringue